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Abstract Undoubtedly, mobile devices (mainly smartphones and tablets up to now)
have become the new paradigm of user-computer interaction. The use of such
gadgets is increasing to unexpected figures and, at the same time, the number of
potential security risks. This paper focuses on the bad-intentioned Android apps, as it
is still the most widely used operating systems for such devices. Accurate detection
of this malware remains an open challenge, mainly due to the ever-changing nature
of malware and the “open” distribution channel of Android apps through Google
Play. Present work uses feature selection for the identification of those features that
may help in characterizing mobile Android-based malware. Maximum Relevance
Minimum Redundancy and genetic algorithms guided by information correlation
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measures have been applied to the Android Malware Genome (Malgenome) dataset,
attaining interesting results on the most informative features for the characterization
of representative families of existing Android malware.
Keywords Feature selection ⋅ Max-Relevance Min-Redundancy criteria ⋅
Information correlation coefficient ⋅ Android ⋅ Malware
1 Introduction
Since the first smartphones came onto the market (late 90s), sales on that sector
have increased constantly until present days. Among all the available operating
systems, Google’s Android actually is the most popular mobile platform, according
to [1]. 250.06 million of Android-run units were sold in Q3 2014 worldwide, out of
301.01. Similarly, the number of apps available at Android’s official store has
increased constantly from the very beginning, up to around 1,541,500 apps [2]
available nowadays. Moreover, Android became the top mobile malware platform
as well. Recent news [3] confirm this trend as 99 % of the new threats that emerged
in Q1 2014 were run on Android. This operating system is an appealing target for
bad-intentioned people, reaching unexpected heights, as there are cases where PC
malware is now being transfigured as Android malware [3].
To fight against such a problem, it is required to understand the malware and its
nature. Otherwise, it will not be possible to practically develop an effective solution
[4]. Thus, present study is focused on the characterization of Android malware
families, trying to reduce the amount of app features needed to distinguish among
all of them. To do so, a real-life publicly-available dataset [5] has been analyzed by
means of several feature selection strategies. From the samples contained in such
dataset, several alarming statistics were found [4], that motivate further research on
Android malware:
• Around one third (36.7 %) of the collected samples leverage root-level exploits
to fully compromise the Android security.
• More than 90 % turn the compromised phones into a botnet controlled through
network or short messages.
• 45.3 % of the samples have the built-in support of sending out background short
messages (to premium-rate numbers) or making phone calls without user
awareness.
• 51.1 % of the samples harvested user’s information, including user accounts and
short messages stored on the phones.
To improve the characterization of the addressed malware, this paper proposes
the use of feature selection. To more easily identify the malware family an app
belongs to, authors address this feature selection problem using a genetic algorithm
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guided by information theory measures. Each individual encodes the subset of
selected features using the binary representation. The evolutionary search process is
guided by crossover and mutation operators specific to the binary encoding and a
fitness function that evaluates the quality of the encoded feature subset. In the
current study, this fitness function can be the mutual information or the information
correlation coefficient.
Feature selection methods are normally used to reduce the number of features
considered in a classification task by removing irrelevant or noisy features [6, 7].
Filter methods perform feature selection independently from the learning algorithm
while wrapper models embed classifiers in the search model [8, 9]. Filter methods
select features based on some measures that determine their relevance to the target
class without any correlation to a learning method. The Minimum-Redundancy
Maximum-Relevance (MRMR) feature selection framework [8] is a well-known
filter method. Besides the maximal relevance criteria, MRMR requires selected
features to further be maximally dissimilar to each other (the minimum redundancy
criteria). On the other hand, wrapper models integrate learning algorithms in the
selection process and determine the relevance of a feature based on the learning
accuracy [10]. Population-based randomized heuristics are normally used to guide
the search towards the optimal feature subset. Wrapper methods require a high
computational time and present a high risk of overfitting [10] but they are able to
model feature dependencies and the interaction of the search model with the
classifier [11]. Although MRMR was previously applied to the detection of mal-
ware [12] and machine learning has also been applied to the detection of android
Malware [13, 14], present study differentiates from previous work as feature
selection is now applied from a new perspective, trying to ease the characterization
of different Android malware families.
The MRMR method is further used in this study to compare or confirm the
subsets of selected features related to Android malware. The results obtained for the
considered problem are extensively analysed, describing their relevance that probes
the positive aspects of gaining deep knowledge of malware nature.
The structure of the paper is as follows: the MRMR method and the proposed
GA-based feature selection algorithm are described in Sect. 2, the experiments for
the Android Malware Genome dataset are presented in Sect. 3, the results obtained
are discussed in Sect. 3.1 and the conclusions of the study are drawn in Sect. 4.
2 Feature Selection Methods
Since the number of features to be analysed in present study is small (see Sect. 3),
the various feature subsets can be extensively evaluated using different methods.
The result of these methods can then be aggregated in a ranking scheme. It is
proposed to determine an ordered list of selected features using (i) Mini-
mum-Redundancy Maximum-Relevance criteria [8] and (ii) a genetic algorithm
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based on information theory measures as fitness function. The methods described in
this section assume a matrix X of N feature values inM samples and an output value
y for each sample.
2.1 Minimum-Redundancy Maximum-Relevance Criteria
The Minimum-Redundancy Maximum-Relevance (MRMR) [8] feature selection
method aims to obtain maximum relevance to output and in the same time mini-
mum redundancy between the selected features.
Defined by means of their probability distribution, the mutual information
between two variables has a higher value for higher degrees of relevance between




p x, yð Þ * log p x, yð Þ
p xð Þ * p yð Þ
 
dxdy ð1Þ
In the first step, the MRMR approach selects one feature out of the N input
features in the set X which has the maximum value of Iðx, yÞ. Let this feature be xk.
Next, one of the features in X − xk is chosen according to the MRMR criteria.
Let us suppose that we have m− 1 features selected already in the subset Sm− 1
and the task is to select the mth feature from X − Sm− 1. This will be the feature that
maximizes the following formula:
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This MRMR scheme can be run for m = 1, 2, 3… resulting in different feature
subsets.
2.2 A Genetic Algorithm Using Information Theory
Measures for Feature Selection
The proposed Genetic Algorithm (GA) encodes in each individual the feature
selection by using a binary representation of features. The size of each individual
equals the number of features and the value of each position can be 0 or 1, where 1
means that the corresponding feature is selected (the number of features is N).
It is proposed to evaluate feature selection results using the following two
measures from information theory [15] as fitness functions: mutual information(I)
and information correlation coefficient (ICC).
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Let H X,Yð Þ denote the joint entropy of the two features, and by I X,Yð Þ the
mutual information between X and Y (see Eq. 1).The information correlation
coefficient ICC X,Yð Þ is calculated based on the Eq. 3 for all the features selected in
individual X and the output Y. ICC measures how independent two features are
from each other (the higher the ICC value the more relevant the relationship is).
ICC X, Yð Þ= IðX,YÞ
HðX,YÞ ð3Þ
If ICC X, Yð Þ=1 then the two variables X and Y are strictly dependent whereas a
value of 0 indicates that they are completely irrelevant to each other.
The resulting genetic algorithm (called GA-INFO, where INFO can be either I or
ICC) is outlined below. The population size is denoted by N, the maximum number
of generations is denoted by G and t represents the current generation.
Algorithm: GA-INFO Feature Selection
Require: X the input variables data set
Require: Y the output vector
P a vector of N Individual objects
t 0
Generate the initial population P(t): randomly initialize the value of each individual
while t <G do
Evaluate each individual IND in P(t): calculate I(IND, Y) or ICC(IND, Y) value
P(t +1) roulette wheel selection from P(t)
for all individuals IND in P(t + 1) do
Select mate J from P(t + 1)
K two-point crossover (IND, J)










Return Best Individual in P(t)
The GA follows a standard scheme in which roulette wheel selection, two-point
crossover and swap mutation are used to guide the search. Each individual is
evaluated based on the correlation between the current subset of selected features
and the output. This correlation is given by either I or ICC used to evaluate the
fitness. Therefore, depending on the fitness function used, two GA variants result:
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GA-I is the GA using mutual information as fitness, while GA-ICC denotes the GA
based on ICC fitness function.
3 Experiments
As previously mentioned, the Malgenome dataset [4], coming from the Android
Malware Genome Project [5] has been analysed in preset study. It was the first large
collection of Android malware (1,260 samples) that was split in 49 different mal-
ware families. It covered the majority of existing Android malware, collected from
their debut in August 2010.
Data related to many different apps were accumulated over more than one year
from a variety of Android Markets, and not only Google Play. Additionally, mal-
ware apps were thoroughly characterized based on their detailed behavior break-
down, including the installation, activation, and payloads.
Collected malware was split in 49 families, that were obtained by “carefully
examining the related security announcements, threat reports, and blog contents
from existing mobile antivirus companies and active researchers as exhaustively as
possible and diligently requesting malware samples from them or actively crawling
from existing official and alternative Android Markets” [4]. The defined families
are: ADRD, AnserverBot, Asroot, BaseBridge, BeanBot, BgServ, CoinPirate,
Crusewin, DogWars, DroidCoupon, DroidDeluxe, DroidDream, DroidDreamLight,
DroidKungFu1, DroidKungFu2, DroidKungFu3, DroidKungFu4, DroidKungFu-
Sapp, DoidKungFuUpdate, Endofday, FakeNetflix, FakePlayer, GamblerSMS,
Geinimi, GGTracker, GingerMaster, GoldDream, Gone60, GPSSMSSpy, Hippo-
SMS, Jifake, jSMSHider, Kmin, Lovetrap, NickyBot, Nickyspy, Pjapps, Plankton,
RogueLemon, RogueSPPush, SMSReplicator, SndApps, Spitmo, TapSnake, Wal-
kinwat, YZHC, zHash, Zitmo, and Zsone. Samples of 14 of the malware families
were obtained from the official Android market, while samples of 44 of the families
came from unofficial markets.
Bad-intentioned apps were then aggregated into 49 malware families [4], and
information on those families is considered in present study. Thus, the analysed
dataset consists of 49 samples (one for each family) and each sample has 26
different features. The features are divided into six categories; installation
(repackaging, update, drive-by download, standalone), activation (BOOT, SMS,
NET, CALL, USB, PKG, BATT, SYS, MAIN), privilege escalation (exploid,
RATC/zimperlich, ginger break, asroot, encrypted), remote control (NET, SMS),
financial charges (phone call, SMS, block SMS), and personal information stealing
(SMS, phone number, user account). The values of those features are 0 (that feature
is not present in that family) and 1 (the feature is present).
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3.1 Results
MRMR, GA-ICC and GA-I algorithms were used for the selection of the best four
features to characterize the above described Android malware families. The GA
parameter setting used is the following:
• population size: 100.
• number of generations: 100
• number of runs for the algorithm in both cases (GA-ICC and GA-I): 50.
Firstly, the four first features have been selected by MRMR method, sorted by
relevance and minimal redundancy. The selected features after the experiments are:
Installation - Repackaging, Activation - SMS, Activation - BOOT, and Remote
Control - NET.
Secondly, GA-INFO has been also applied to the same dataset for comparison
purposes. Figure 1 displays the values obtained by ICC and mutual information
(I) when running the GA for each one of the features. The Y axis shows the values
of ICC and I respectively.
The GA-ICC and GA-I select two different individuals ([Installation - Repack-
aging, Installation - Standalone, Remote Control - NET, Activation - SMS] and
[Installation - Repackaging, Installation –Standalone, Remote Control - NET,
Financial Charges- SMS]) respectively, with the same fitness value for ICC and MI
(0.18 and 0.99 respectively).
It should be noted that the GA methods were able to reach the optimum values in
the population very early in the search process – around generation 11 (see Figs. 2
and 3). Each line represents a run of the algorithm, some lines overlap in some
Fig. 1 ICC and I results for each feature
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executions that were similar - and that is why 50 lines can not be identified. This is
due to the relatively small number of features that had to be considered in the
search, leading to an individual size easy to handle and quickly explore many
feature subsets.
The features selected by the three different algorithms are shown in Table 1 and,
according to their relevance (being included in the selected subset), they are ordered
in Table 2.
Fig. 2 Fitness ICC values in each generation of the 50 algorithm runs
Fig. 3 Fitness I values in each generation of the 50 algorithm runs
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According to results shown in Tables 1 and 2, features ‘Installation – Repack-
aging’ and ‘Remote Control – NET’ have been selected by the three algorithms.
Hence, it can be concluded that those features are the most relevant ones for the
characterization of Android malware families.
The repackaging way of installation was defined by the authors of the dataset [4]
as “one of the most common techniques malware authors use to piggyback mali-
cious payloads into popular applications (or simply apps). In essence, malware
authors may locate and download popular apps, disassemble them, enclose mali-
cious payloads, and then re-assemble and submit the new apps to official and/or
alternative Android Markets.” Furthermore, from the collected samples, dataset
authors found that 1,083 of them (or 86.0 %) were repackaged versions of legiti-
mate applications with malicious payloads.
Regarding the remote control feature, dataset authors stated [4] that 93.0 % of the
samples turn the infected phones into bots for remote control. Moreover, 1, 171 of
the samples use the HTTP-based web traffic to receive bot commands.
In a second order of importance, ‘Installation – Standalone’ and ‘Activation –
SMS’, together with ‘Activation – BOOT’ and ‘Financial Charges – SMS’ have
been identified as key features for characterizing malware families.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has proposed several methods for selecting those features that best
characterize malware families in Malgenome dataset. A genetic algorithm using a
binary representation and a fitness function based on information theory measures
(mutual information and information correlation coefficient) has been developed for
Table 1 Selected features by
each one of the applied
methods
Feature MRMR GA-I GA-ICC
Installation - repackaging √ √ √
Installation - standalone √ √
Activation - SMS √ √
Activation - BOOT √
Remote control - NET √ √ √
Financial charges - SMS √
Table 2 Ordered list of
selected features
Feature Relevance
Installation - repackaging 100 %
Remote control - NET 100 %
Installation - standalone 66 %
Activation - SMS 66 %
Activation - BOOT 33 %
Financial charges - SMS 33 %
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the selection of the optimal subset of features in the considered problem. Experi-
mental results show that the applied methods agree on the selection of 3 of the 4
major features.
Future work will extend these methods to consider other measures as fitness
functions in evolutionary search or other population-based search heuristics.
A hybridization of such methods and MRMR-based approaches will also be
investigated. Additionally, the applicability of these methods to more datasets for
the characterization of Android malware families will be further explored.
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